Authors
László Márkusz1; 1 National University of Public Service, Hungary Discussion
In the history of Serbian nationalism in the last two centuries, depending on the dominant political goal, we can distinguish four major eras: 1. SECESSION – independence from the Ottoman Empire (1804-1878), 2. EXPANSION - expanding the borders of the Serbian monarchy (1878-1918), 3. ASSIMILATION - attempt to merge cultures in the Yugoslav context (1918-1981), 4. IRREDENTA - Serbian revisionism as a reaction to Yugoslav disintegration (1981-). Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, state borders emerged again between Serbia proper and large ethnic Serb-populated areas. Ernest Gellner’s definition describes nationalism as a political principle that stands for the perfect overlap of political and national unity. The violation of this sacred principle of nationalist sentiment, or in other words, the ethnic territorial loss between 1991 and 2008, explains the anger and frustration Serbian politics displayed in the last decades. Understanding this background of the Serbian elite's attitude towards international state-building efforts in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is crucial. International state-building aimed to create functional democratic countries with strong institutions that exercise effective control over the entire territory of the state. These state-building efforts have often conflicted with the strategic goals of Serbian nationalism, which aims to maintain some level of control over areas in neighbouring countries that ethnic Serbs populate. Even the political term "Serbian World" (Srpski svet) emerged in 2020 as a concept for the political unification of the Serbian nation across borders. The Serbian elite opposes the centralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo, while also attempting to limit their international outreach. This presentation will illustrate these claims with examples. One significant example is how the Bosnian Serb political elite has halted any further centralization efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2005. They have used outright threats of illegal referendums, declarations of independence, and unification with Serbia to achieve this. The leadership in Banja Luka even launched an international campaign against attempts at 'nation-building.' In Kosovo, the leadership in Belgrade has successfully maintained certain elements of its state administration in Serbian-majority municipalities and aims to legitimize this presence through the Brussels dialogue. Additionally, the Bosnian Serb political elite has created obstacles to NATO integration for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 2015, Belgrade has conducted a successful international campaign to limit the process of international recognition for Kosovo and its membership in international organizations. However, it would be unjust to hold Serbian nationalism solely responsible for all the conflicts that have taken place in the Western Balkans in recent decades. Other nationalisms in the region have also exhibited similar characteristics and intention.