Authors

Florence Ertel¹;  ¹ University of Passau, Germany

Discussion

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has changed the security environment of the European Union (EU) and its eastern neighbours, leading to what is referred to as the return of geopolitics in political and public discourse (Ertel, 2025). Nevertheless, the definition of geopolitics is often vague in academic and political debates. The geo-prefix frequently refers to power politics as well as security and defence policies (Nickel, 2024). In addition, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a significant element of geopolitical power struggles and competition. In an increasingly challenging global environment, states are becoming more cautious about relying on foreign technology and striving for digital sovereignty. Therefore, the process of AI development can be described as “geopolitical innovation race for technological leadership” (Schmid et al., 2025). This highlights the need to analyse the role of generative AI tools, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), and to assess their usage and regulation critically. In authoritarian contexts, regulation can bolster state power, reinforce official narratives, and influence the global balance of power, positioning LLM development within ideological and geopolitical agendas. Russia’s National AI Strategy, for example, ties its technological ambitions to foreign policy, emphasising AI leadership as crucial for global influence (Khalilova & Ellerby, 2025). Against this backdrop, the paper aims to analyse whether Russia employs LLMs as tools of geopolitical power in the post-Soviet region, which Russia considers as a legitimate sphere of its dominance. Especially the Eastern Partnership (EaP) states are at the centre of geopolitical rivalry. The EaP is the EU’s main instrument to establish closer relations with countries in its Eastern neighbourhood. Overall, the Russian war in Ukraine strengthened the EaP states’ orientation towards the EU (apart from Belarus), culminating in EU candidate status for Moldova and Ukraine in 2022 and Georgia in 2023. However, since 2024, the latter has been turning away from its pro-European course, with rapidly advancing autocratisation. To cover the different developments, the paper will examine Armenia, a member state of the Eurasian Economic Union with strong economic ties to Russia; Georgia, which is experiencing democratic backsliding; and Moldova, which is persistently pursuing its pro-EU path. First, the paper will examine the role of Russian LLMs within these states by investigating their use at both the population and government levels. Second, it will explore how the respective governments respond to the potential spread of Russian LLMs in their territories through regulatory behaviour. To achieve this, a secondary analysis of various documents will be conducted, including government data, laws and media coverage. Additionally, qualitative interviews will be conducted with media policy experts for the three countries.