Following the recent surge of interest in Russia’s long and complex history of frontier governance and expansion, this paper examines anti-corruption measures at Russia’s customs institutions between 1991 and 2024.

The study begins by tracing how the large-scale state contraband schemes of the 2000s evolved from the smuggling experiments of the 1990s. These early practices produced a new stratum of “border bureaucrats” who viewed the crisis-era tolerance for smuggling as a viable operational model. Over time, they transformed these temporary arrangements into a long-term customs routine.

Next, the paper analyzes how, from the mid-2000s onward, anti-corruption campaigns in border control became a strategic instrument of statecraft amid the securitization of resources, capital, and borders by the Russian political police (FSB). Drawing on social media investigations and long-term anti-corruption statistics from the Russian customs, the study explores East–West comparative dynamics in this respect and traces the evolution of corruption alliances among customs officers, entrepreneurs, and FSB border agents from the 1990s and 2000s. It also examines the shifting nature of state-led anti-corruption efforts during the 2010s and 2020s. It claims that the events in Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022 intensified anti-corruption campaigns—likely intended to deflect attention from the regime’s growing vulnerabilities during these crises.

The chapter then investigates the social composition of individuals implicated in customs-related corruption cases, revealing a complex web of conflicts of interest involving customs officials, security officers, and entrepreneurs. A notable feature of these investigations was their episodic character: cases were frequently dropped following high-profile arrests or dismissals, only to be reopened later. This inconsistency reflected the deep entanglement of corruption across all levels of border control and federal authority, with FSB officers implicated in nearly every case—often protected by the very system they served.

The final section identifies enduring continuities between post-Communist customs corruption and similar practices of the 1920s, while also emphasizing key differences from the Soviet period, including persistent power struggles between federal and regional border control offices. Drawing comparisons with studies of customs corruption in the European Union, the paper highlights the distinctively Russian character of these practices. Far from consisting of isolated incidents, post-Soviet customs corruption emerges as a deeply embedded phenomenon—rooted in the Soviet legacy of state–society separation, recurring modes of governance, and the continuing dominance of the political police (FSB) in civilian border control.