In Russia, morality has long been a debatable topic. Its prominence can be explained by the particular Russian intellectual tradition (Boobbyer 2005) and by broader importance of the moral dimension in social life (Sayer 2011). Research into morality in Russia has largely been divided between two arguments: the persistence of ‘amorality’ in society from the Soviet period onwards (e.g., Kon 1996, Gudkov 2013) or a rejection of this position highlighting the complexity of the moral domain (e.g., Yurchak 2006, Sharafutdinova 2021, Fishman 2022). Interpretive instruments for research on morality include concepts such as values, virtue ethics, homo sovieticus/homo post-sovieticus or trauma, which have their limitations. As this paper argues, the common barrier for in-depth analysis of moral issues has been a lack of theorisation and conceptualisation of morality. 

This paper employs a Durkheimian perspective on morality, clarified and extended by the author, that enables us to disentangle the moral domain of society and apply this in the Russian context. First, the paper conceptualises morality as a system of concepts including moral ideal, moral obligation, social attachment to the group, and individual autonomy. Second, morality is differentiated from mores: morality exists in the form of sacred collective representations in the symbolic domain, while mores pertain to the profane domain of daily practices. Third, morality(ies) of contemporary societies are diverse and changing due to the changing social practices. Moralities produced by powerful social institutions such as the state and media (moral order) create a framework for social behaviour but there is always a discrepancy between the moral order and moral being of society.

Finally, the paper demonstrates the dramatic transformations of the moral order and morality of society in Russia since the late Soviet period, using reflexive thematic analysis of public statements of the state and three mainstream media. The study finds that an ongoing morality of society based on the ideals of human fellowship and justice was officially supported by the socialist moral order which prioritised the common good and the socially oriented individual aware of her obligations to others. In contrast the post-Soviet moral order dismantled obligations to others, prioritised the self-interested individual and the state. This widened the gap between the official moral order and the ongoing morality of society. The Durkheimian approach disentangles the moral domain and highlights the role of the state and media in moral regulation.