Authors

Discussion

Russia’s accelerated energy reorientation toward China following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents a structural shift with far-reaching implications for the geopolitics of Persian Gulf hydrocarbons. Once oriented toward European markets, Moscow has sought to secure demand in Asia through long-term arrangements with Beijing—including the Power of Siberia-1 and Power of Siberia-2 gas pipelines, new oil transit routes through Kazakhstan, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from Arctic LNG-2 and Sakhalin-2. These initiatives, formalized in 2025, have consolidated Russia’s position as China’s top oil supplier and its emerging second-largest gas partner. Politically, they signal a durable Sino-Russian energy axis that fuses commercial pragmatism with geopolitical alignment under conditions of sanctions and economic isolation.

For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—above all Saudi Arabia and Qatar—this eastward realignment alters both market structures and strategic assumptions. Russia’s heavily discounted crude and relatively cheap pipeline gas have undercut Gulf exports in Asia, forcing Riyadh to revise official selling prices and to deepen vertical integration into Chinese downstream assets. Through equity participation in refineries and petrochemical complexes in Liaoning, Guangdong, and Zhejiang, Saudi Aramco seeks to internalize demand risk by becoming a quasi-domestic supplier in the Chinese market. Qatar, meanwhile, has responded by locking in “security of demand” via 27-year LNG supply agreements with Sinopec and CNPC—contracts that anchor Qatari gas in China’s energy balance well into the 2050s.

This paper situates these strategies within the conceptual framework of energy geopolitics and producer-state adaptation. Drawing on the notions of security of demand, strategic hedging, and market interdependence, it argues that the GCC producers have turned external shocks into instruments of resilience. While Russia’s surge in Asia intensifies short-term competition, Gulf exporters benefit from Russia’s diminished presence in Europe, their own cost and investment advantages, and the ability to play simultaneously in multiple energy theatres. Ultimately, the analysis underscores that the geopolitics of Gulf hydrocarbons is no longer confined to OPEC+ coordination or price cycles; it is increasingly defined by how regional producers reposition themselves within the emerging Sino-Russian energy bloc and the broader reconfiguration of Eurasian energy flows.