Discussion
Much of the existing literature on the Western sanctions imposed on Russia assume that they triggered a rally-around-the-flag effect in Russia's domestic politics and ongoing public support for Russia's war in Ukraine. Yet there is little actual research on the way sanctions are presented for public consumption in Russia, while the research on the political effects of sanctions on public opinion appears to contradict research on the ways that autocracies seek legitimation. Research conducted in the decade prior to the full-scale invasion found that sanctions triggered rallying effects when they were framed in nationalist terms. By contrast, recent research finds that autocracies tend to rely on intimidation rather than nationalism when faced with economic sanctions or domestic protest. Russia's media discourse about Western sanctions sits squarely at the intersection of these literatures. On the one hand, sanctions have been closely bound up with military conflict in Ukraine for more than a decade. The current sanctions regime was first introduced in response to Russia's occupation of Crimea and launching of an undeclared war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. With Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the sanctions regime was significantly strengthened and expanded. On the other, sanctions directly affect the Kremlin's ongoing legitimation of autocratic rule, which has involved a combination of patriotic appeals, demobilization and repression of political opposition, and claims of economic competence.
Drawing from a content analysis of Russian broadcast transcripts from the state-run First Channel (Pervyi Kanal) throughout 2022-2025, this paper argues that the Kremlin seeks to rally support, intimidate opposition, and mobilize the nation by normalizing war and sanctions. The analysis thus bridges between the existing research on rallying effects and autocratic legitimation, centering on the ways that the media framing of sanctions suspends audiences in a period of "unsettled times." In particular, normalization works by extending time horizons for evaluations of the performance of Russia's government in coping with sanctions, diminishing popular expectations for sanctions relief through nationalist portrayals of the West as driven by irrational and interminable Russophobia, and portraying Russia's targeting by Western sanctions as part of a common and enduring global malaise.
