Authors

Discussion

Since the outbreak of the large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, the Russian regime's self-image and language have undergone dynamic change. A key feature of this process is the establishment of a quasi-religious style in political communication. This new language of the Russian leadership is eschatological in nature, as it declares Russia and its war against Ukraine to be holy. Furthermore, Russia is referred to as the Katechon, i.e., the Restrainer (2 Thessalonians 2: 6-7). According to this, Russia fulfills the divine mission of restraining the Antichrist. The latter corresponds to the globalist West and its elites. This quasi-Christian self-representation takes place in a heterogeneous society that has a strong Muslim minority and continues to sympathize with the legacy of the USSR. Against this backdrop, a hybrid and interdenominational folk religion is to be established, based on the “Crimean consensus” and emulating the imaginary Byzantine Empire. At the same time, this folk religion integrates the cultural and political heritage of the USSR and is explicitly aimed at secular or atheist parts of the population. This paper focuses on the basic elements of this folk religion, such as “Russian-Byzantine identity,” and attempts to trace the genesis of the concept of Katechon in recent political discourse in Russia.

 Furthermore, this paper attempts to understand the extent to which the self-designation as Christian Orthodox is consistent with empirically measurable religiosity in Russia. It also questions the practical acceptability of this originally Christian-inspired ideology for Muslim communities in Russia.