Authors

Discussion

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a decisive turning point in its regional standing, particularly in the South Caucasus. The war drained Moscow’s military, diplomatic, and economic resources, leading to a visible erosion of its traditional influence over Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Azerbaijan’s complete victory in 2023, which brought a definitive end to the Karabakh conflict, underscored the collapse of Russia’s peacekeeping credibility and its inability to shape post-war arrangements. The downing of an Azerbaijani plane by Russian forces further strained relations between Baku and Moscow, accelerating Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment toward greater independence and diversified partnerships. Meanwhile, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s “Fourth Armenian Republic” doctrine reflected Yerevan’s ideological and political shift away from Moscow, signalling a move toward Western integration and democratic self-determination. In Georgia, mass protests and a pro-democracy rebellion challenged pro-Russian elements within the government, reaffirming the Georgian public’s enduring aspiration for Euro-Atlantic alignment.

Against this backdrop, the Washington Accords between Baku and Yerevan—brokered under Western mediation—marked a historic step towards regional normalisation without Russian involvement, further diminishing Moscow’s diplomatic leverage. Concurrently, the TRIPP framework (Turkey–Russia–Iran–Peace Platform) began to erode as regional actors prioritised sovereignty and Western engagement over Russian-centred multilateralism.

Ultimately, this paper aims to analyse how Russia, once the uncontested hegemon of the South Caucasus, has lost its grip on a region historically regarded as its strategic stronghold.