Authors
Ekaterina Kalinina2; Oleg Pachenkov3; Lillia Voronkova3; Valeria Rumiantseva1; 1 Independent Researcher, UK; 2 Stockholm University, Sweden; 3 CISR Berlin, Germany Discussion
This presentation will focus on the empirical results of the research project that examines how civic and political activists in Russia adopted their strategies, sustained/created new networks, and and managed risks between 2022 and early 2025 amid intensifying repression following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The aim of this presentation is to explain what kinds of political activism persist, where and how it is organised, and which tactics allow activists to survive and prepare for future windows of opportunity. We pay particular attention to regional dynamics, the resilience of election of campaign-era infrastructures, and the evolving ethics of collaboration. We have used a combination of methods: 50 biographical, problem-oriented semi-structured interviews and participant observation in multiple cities across the Ural, Volga, North-West, Central and Siberian districts, supplemented by a focused discussion with local politicians and their supporters. Fieldwork took place between November 2024 and February 2025, using snowball sampling via trusted gatekeepers; researchers typically spent about a week per site to embed informal interactions in context. The sample spans two cohorts: local political actors (deputies, candidates, campaigners) and civic activists (urban development, heritage, ecology, feminist and cultural initiatives). Results show a pragmatic, risk-aware political and civic activism. First, we observed that activists map and carefully navigate informal “red lines” which force them to adopt a careful communication strategy of splitting their activities into public, coded outreach and private, candid workstreams. Second, we observed that political opportunities still remain outside the capitals: in economically less Moscow-dependent regions, with high competition among local elites, sustained partial pluralism at a local level. Third, we came to conclusion that the short-lived 2024 Boris Nadezhdin presidential bid unexpectedly seeded durable regional networks that continue into 2025 as platforms for oppositional coordination and learning of political skills, which might be seen as an evidence the infrastructures that survived after the campaign can outlast its leader. Fourth, we saw that young people continue to be interested in politics motivated by injustice and political socialisation through YouTube influencers and independent exile media. All together, Russian political and civic activism has not disappeared. It has reconfigured: the actions became small-scale and strategically patient, trying to build capacity and anticipating future openings. 
