Discussion
Mancur Olson’s theory of “distributional coalitions” (Olson, 1982) – alliances between state officials and influential societal actors who selectively implement structural reforms to serve their own interests – offers an explanation for the uncertainty of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe. The Russian invasion in 2022, however, profoundly reshaped the environment in which such coalitions operate. Only major political shocks – such as war or a sharp reorientation of foreign policy – are capable of disrupting the equilibrium of such distributional alliances. Ukraine presents precisely such a case: the existential threat of national survival has disrupted oligarchic monopolies and compelled the political elite to reconfigure their role vis-à-vis state and society. In developing states, these coalitions persist due to the limited resources of state institutions and their vulnerability to the influence of societal actors. This dynamic was described by Joel Migdal in terms of “strong societies and weak states.” (Migdal, 1988) Within this framework, Western incentives for democratization – such as “linkage” (Levitsky, Way 2010) refers to deep economic, educational, cultural, and social ties with the West, while “leverage” denotes external influence in the form of financial assistance in exchange for reforms. Ukraine’s relatively deep linkages with the West – manifest in civil society cooperation, cultural and educational exchange – created structural incentives for political elites to frame national survival as tied to European integration. The simultaneous presence of Western leverage, in the form of military assistance, financial aid, and conditionalities linked to governance reforms, added external pressure.
The greatest democratic progress was achieved in those states that possessed both strong linkages to the West and sufficient organizational capacity. Where the first condition was absent, circumstances tended to favor the consolidation of nondemocratic regimes. As Levitsky and Way demonstrate, the degree of organizational power held by regimes (that is, their ability to control parliament, security services, and the judiciary) became decisive: where this capacity was high, authoritarian regimes managed to entrench themselves; where it was limited, hybrid regimes with features of competitive authoritarianism emerged. Most former Soviet republics lacked both meaningful connections with the West and exposure to its political pressure. Western actors, motivated by strategic concerns – such as balancing Russia’s regional influence and containing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia – extended economic assistance to authoritarian governments in the region without demanding democratization or political reform in return. The case of Ukraine suggests that war can simultaneously dismantle, reinvent distributional coalitions and invite new coalitional bargains.
