Authors
Jakob Hauter1; 1 University of Reading, UK Discussion
Attempts to explain Russia’s invasions of Ukraine based on realist International Relations (IR) theory are controversial. The frequent invocation of realism in efforts to shift blame away from Russia, in calls to reduce military support for Ukraine, and in proposals to negotiate about Ukraine without Ukraine has caused understandable outrage. This paper argues that it is important to call out dubious conclusions and policy recommendations from self-proclaimed realists but that it is unhelpful to direct this criticism at realism as such and all its proponents.
Realism is an essential component of any explanation for Russia’s actions because there is strong evidence that its leadership sees the world to some extent through a realist lens. However, this neither makes realism the only game in town nor does it trivialize or justify the decision to invade Ukraine. On the contrary, a realist worldview is perfectly compatible with imperialist ideology. It is perfectly plausible that the Russian leadership wanted to reinstate its political and cultural dominance over Ukraine and, at the same time, wanted to rid itself of a perceived threat from Ukraine. What should be rejected is not the notion that realism played a role but the notion that realism diminishes the role of imperial ambition and made war an inevitable and even reasonable choice.
I will present my argument in four steps. Firstly, I will discuss the different facets of realist IR theory and their assumptions. Secondly, I will show how evidence of realist thinking features prominently in the actions of the Russian leadership in relation to the invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. I will point out that the realist framework is important not because it represents an eternal and fundamental law of IR but because the Russian leadership used it for its decision-making. In contrast, realist thinking was much less prominent in US and EU policy towards Ukraine. Thirdly, I will discuss the shortcomings of a realist analysis of Russia’s decisions to invade Ukraine. I will argue that realism alone cannot explain the timing and the viciousness of the invasions. It cannot be the sole or even the primary explanation but only one component of a larger explanatory framework. This framework also has to include imperialist ideology and flawed perceptions of threats, capabilities, and opportunities. These factors are perfectly compatible with realism if we abandon the notion that realist thinking must be objective and non-ideological. Finally, I will discuss the pitfalls of making value judgements and policy recommendations based on realist analysis. Because realist thinking features prominently in Russian political and media discourse, there is a risk of realist analysis becoming contaminated with propaganda tropes. In particular, there is a risk of rationalizing military aggression, downplaying Ukrainian agency, and overstating the prospects of negotiations. 
