Autocrats care deeply about their popularity, both domestically and internationally, and employ a range of strategies to boost popular support. These strategies can involve demonstrating competence, projecting an image of effective governance, and fostering normative support for the regime’s values and principles. Contemporary “informational” autocrats, which rely less on mass repression, are also increasingly characterized by their use of propaganda, censorship, and silencing (Guriev & Treisman, 2019). Yet, how effective are such strategies in enhancing an autocrat’s image abroad, particularly among citizens or former compatriots now residing in democratic societies?

To address this question, this study explores what families who no longer live in Russia value in Putin and how they perceive—and explain—his high approval ratings documented by Russian polls. The study employs original focus group data collected in 2024 in Germany available for families with and without Soviet and Russian backgrounds. The qualitative data allows for exploring where families with a migratory background locate potential sources of support for Putin and how they recognize and articulate mechanisms such as propaganda, limited media freedom, and (self-)censorship in Russia.

Preliminary results suggest that Putin's performance, particularly in contrast to the instability of the 1990s, along with his emphasis on traditional values—such as the centrality of the family—are among the main perceived drivers of support among Russian-background families. The qualitative analysis further discusses when and how the participants acknowledged the influence of state-driven strategies such as propaganda, media restrictions, and (self-)censorship in shaping public opinion and support for Putin.