Authors

Discussion

Abstract

This paper examines the role of Central Asia and Soviet Islam in shaping Saudi–Soviet relations, particularly during the Cold War.  It analyses how, despite ideological contrasts, Soviet diplomacy – particularly in its relations with Saudi Arabia – employed a distinct and strategic use of what I term the 'Islam Card'. This tactic allowed the Soviets to surpass their Western adversaries’ influence over Saudi Arabia and the wider Arab world; it is evident that Soviet officials recognised Mecca’s influence. As reflected in correspondence between Stalin and Georgy Chicherin, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Access to Mecca holds undeniable significance for us’; the Soviet Union was the first non-Arab country to recognise and establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, then a ‘young country’, in 1926. 

It is important to remember that the Soviet Union was home to the world's sixth-largest Muslim population, as there were an estimated 45 million Soviet Muslims. Given this large Muslim population, Moscow sought recognition and allegiance from millions of its Muslim citizens. Simultaneously, it employed the strategy of relying exclusively on Muslim diplomats, particularly those from Central Asia, as negotiators in the Arab world. This diplomatic move built more trust than the approach of Saudi Arabia’s Western allies, given that only Muslims can enter Mecca, it gave them a chance to attend most of the Islamic world conferences. 

The role of a Soviet diplomat thus offered a fitting opportunity to ‘look after’ its Hajj Delegation. Pilgrims were often accompanied by medical teams, with the Soviet Red Crescent providing support, thereby establishing a unique diplomatic channel. This paper examines the role of Central Asia using Hajj as a case study. I investigate how the Soviet state organised the Hajj pilgrimage missions and what motivated them to lift the ban on Hajj in 1945 and allow its Muslim citizens to participate.

 I also consider how this decision reflects Soviet domestic priorities and foreign policy goals. Moreover, I address the existence of evidence regarding Soviet espionage during the Hajj, as well as how the Saudi government responded to potential espionage concerns. I aim to decolonise the dominant, Western-centric narrative and Moscow-centred narratives. This research examines the often-neglected sphere of Soviet–Saudi relations by drawing on governmental documents, unpublished material from the Saudi side, and the family archives of Central Asians who came to Mecca during the Hajj.