Authors

Discussion

Russia and China have both been proactive in their diplomatic overtures to the countries of the ‘Global South’ and leverage anti(or at least Western-sceptic) biases. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought the Global South into renewed focus as the latter ‘reorganises to pursue its own interests’. The war has highlighted a divergence on priorities: in the West the emphasis is on the values at stake and Western leaders talk of defending a rules-based order. Yet many in the Global South reject this framing. China arguably commands greater authority and legitimacy within the UNSC as it uses its multiple identities as both P5 member and a developing country and makes claims around developmentalism and state stability. Russia attempts to use its Soviet legacy and a decolonising narrative to undermine Western narratives. Yet economically, China has a successful development story to tell (and sell to) the world, unlike Russia. Politically, China’s claims to speak to the developing world as a former colonized state are also more legitimate, not because it was until recently a developing state, but because, unlike Russia, it was a former colonized state and, unlike Russia, a former leadingmember of the Bandung movement. Therefore when China engages with Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean, it does so on shared decolonizing ground. This paper examines the extent to which Chinese and Russian narratives clash and to what extent they are complementary.